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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge: 
 
Mike Mustafa appeals following acceptance of his guilty 
plea. He argues that his guilty plea was not knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent, and that the district court erred 
in relying upon the money laundering guideline in 
calculating his sentence. We affirm the district court's use 
of the money laundering sentencing guideline, and we 
conclude that his plea was knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent. Accordingly, we deny Mustafa's r equest to 
withdraw his guilty plea. However, we conclude that the 
district court did err in not considering Mustafa's ability to 
pay the restitution that was imposed in the amount of 
$732,223. Accordingly, we will remand for resentencing 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. 
 
On December 8, 1998, a federal grand jury in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania retur ned a 46 count 
indictment charging Mike Mustafa with mail fraud, 
malicious destruction of a building by fir e, use of fire to 
commit a felony, food stamp fraud, money laundering and 
making false statements in obtaining a bank loan. The 
indictment charged that Mustafa fraudulently inflated his 
income in documents he had submitted to the Shar on 
Savings Bank to purchase and renovate a building in which 
he planned to operate a supermarket. 
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According to the indictment, Mustafa operated the Buy 
and Save Supermarket in the building he pur chased with 
the loan proceeds. He also obtained an insurance policy on 
the building and business, and he subsequently caused the 
building to be destroyed by a four alar m fire so that he 
could collect the proceeds of the insurance policy. The 
indictment also charged that, while he operated the 
supermarket, he deposited over $1.5 million worth of 
fraudulently obtained food stamps into an account at the 
Sharon Savings Bank; a bank authorized to r eceive food 
stamps. In order to participate in the food stamp program, 
Mustafa had to submit an application to the United States 
Department of Agriculture acknowledging that the account 
would be used to deposit food stamps obtained pursuant to 
applicable regulations and restrictions. The indictment 
further alleged that Mustafa completed a requir ed 
"redemption certificate" with each food stamp deposit. Each 
redemption certificate purported to verify that the food 
stamps Mustafa was depositing were obtained in a manner 
that was consistent with controlling USDA r egulations. 
 
Mustafa originally entered a plea of not guilty and 
proceeded to trial. During the first thr ee days of that trial 
the government called 20 witnesses. The testimony 
included evidence of Mustafa's motive to set thefire and 
collect the insurance proceeds,1 the suspicious nature of 
the fire, and circumstances tending to establish that only 
Mustafa and his brothers had access to the building, and 
the alarm code. The government also intr oduced the 
testimony of an employee who testified that Mustafa had 
attempted to persuade him to say that the fir e was caused 
by a pot of potatoes left on the stove. 
 
The government also introduced a financial analysis of 
supermarket records, and testimony of witnesses regarding 
the food stamp fraud Mustafa was conducting fr om the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Mustafa had over $500,000 in personal debt, and the supermarket 
was in serious financial trouble. Some of the income Mustafa was 
deriving from the supermarket was derived from a fraudulent food stamp 
scheme, but changes in the food stamp program itself meant that the 
scheme would soon end, and Mustafa's only viable asset was the 
insurance policy on the building and the super market business. 
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supermarket. That evidence established that Mustafa had 
to submit a USDA application stating that his account at 
Sharon Savings Bank would be used for food stamps that 
the supermarket received in exchange for food pursuant to 
USDA regulations. The government's witnesses established 
that Mustafa regularly purchased food stamps from 
persons trafficking in illegal food stamps, and that he then 
deposited those stamps into the Sharon Savings Bank 
account. Each time he made such a deposit, he had to 
submit a redemption certificate, confir ming that the 
deposited food stamps were properly r eceived in connection 
with the purchase and sale of groceries. When records from 
legitimate food stamp transactions were compar ed with the 
deposits to the Sharon Bank account, the evidence 
established that Mustafa had deposited over $1.5 million in 
illegal food stamps into that account. 
 
Three days into the trial, Mustafa changed his plea 
pursuant to a written plea agreement. He ther eafter entered 
an open plea of guilty to all counts of the indictment except 
those related to the arson of the super market. The arson 
related charges were dismissed pursuant to the plea 
agreement. That agreement stated in part: 
 
       Total possible maximum sentence is 830 years of 
       incarceration, a fine of $1,260,000 plus twice the value 
       of property involved in the money laundering scheme, 
       and five years supervised release. 
 
       The defendant further understands that supervised 
       release may be revoked if its terms and conditions are 
       violated. When supervised release is revoked, the 
       original term of imprisonment may be incr eased by the 
       period of three years. Thus a violation of supervised 
       release increases the possible period of incarceration 
       and makes it possible that the defendant will have to 
       serve the original sentence, plus a substantial 
       additional period, without credit for time alr eady spent 
       on supervised release. 
 
       *** 
       *** 
       *** 
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       8. The defendant may not withdraw his plea because 
       the Court declines to follow any recommendation, 
       motion or stipulation by the parties to this agr eement. 
       No one has promised or guaranteed to the defendant 
       what sentence the Court will impose. 
 
       *** 
 
       10. It is agreed that no additional promises, 
       agreements or conditions have been enter ed into other 
       than those set forth in this document, and none will be 
       entered into unless in writing and signed by all the 
       parties. 
 
Supplemental App. at 341a -343a. 
 
On March 18, 1999, during the change of plea hearing, 
the government outlined the terms of the plea to the 
defendant in open court. The government r eiterated many 
of the terms of the written agreement including the 
maximum sentences for each count Mustafa was pleading 
guilty to. The Assistant United States Attor ney told the 
defendant: 
 
       [t]he plea agreement states that the defendant may not 
       withdraw the plea because this Court may decide to 
       decline to follow any recommendation or stipulation by 
       the parties. 
 
       The plea also indicates that no one has promised or 
       guaranteed Mr. Mustafa what the sentence will be, and 
       the plea states that Mr. Mustafa is satisfied with his 
       legal representation and that he is agr eeing to plead 
       guilty because he is in fact guilty. 
 
       Lastly, the plea agreement states that no pr omises, 
       agreements or conditions have been enter ed into other 
       than those that I've articulated as part of the plea 
       agreement. 
 
App. at 40. The following exchange ensued: 
 
       THE COURT: Could you total the -- give the total 
       maximum? 
 
       AUSA: Yes. I'm sorry. I neglected to state that. 
       The total maximum sentence, your Honor, is 830 years 
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       incarceration, a fine of $1,260,000, plus twice the 
       value involved in the money laundering scheme, and 
       five years of supervised release. 
        
       THE COURT: [Defense counsel], is that your 
 
       understanding of the agreement? 
 
       DEFENSE ATTORNEY: It is, sir. 
 
       THE COURT: Mr. Mustafa, is that your understanding 
       of the agreement? 
 
       DEFENDANT MUSTAFA: Yes. 
 
App. at 41-42. 
 
Since Mustafa had pled guilty to 40 counts of money 
laundering, the district court applied U.S.S.G.S 2S1.1, the 
money laundering guideline, and determined that Mustafa's 
base offense level was 20. The district court then increased 
that level by five because the value of the funds was greater 
than $1 million but less than $2 million, see  U.S.S.G. 
S 2S1.1(b)(2)(F), and added an upward adjustment of two 
levels for obstruction of justice based on Mustafa's attempt 
to change testimony of a former employee, see U.S.S.G. 
S 3C1.1, and a three level upward adjustment based upon 
endangering public safety, and the extensive damage 
caused by the fire, see U.S.S.G.SS 5K2.14, 5K2.5. The 
court determined that Mustafa had not fully accepted 
responsibility for his crimes, and it ther efore refused to 
grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under 
U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1. The court calculated a criminal history 
category of II based upon a 1985 conviction for distribution 
of cocaine. That criminal history category combined with 
the resulting total base offense level of 30 yielded a 
sentencing range of 108 to 135 months. The court 
sentenced Mustafa to 135 months of imprisonment,five 
years supervised release, special assessments in the 
amount of $4,300, and restitution in the amount of 
$732,223.2 This appeal followed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Mustafa objected to the PSI on several factual grounds, however, he 
did not object to the application of the money laundering guidelines. 
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II. 
 
Mustafa raises numerous issues on appeal.3 However, we 
conclude that only three of his assertions merit discussion. 
Accordingly, we will limit our discussion to: 1) the 
voluntariness of the guilty plea, 2) the application of the 
money laundering guideline, and 3) whether the district 
court erred by failing to inquire into Mustafa's ability to pay 
the restitution that was imposed. In all other respects, the 
district court's judgment is affirmed without further 
discussion. 
 
A. 
 
Although Mustafa now seeks to withdraw his guilty plea, 
he never moved to withdraw the plea in the district court, 
nor did he object to any portion of the Rule 11 change of 
plea colloquy. He now alleges that the district court failed 
to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and 
that the error was not harmless.4 See United States v. DeLe 
Puente, 755 F.2d 313,314 (1985). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. He argues that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent, and should therefore be withdrawn. He also claims that the 
district court erred in each of the following r espects: applying the 
money 
laundering guideline to his conviction, imposing a sentence outside of 
the "applicable guideline range on the loan fraud count," upwardly 
adjusting the sentence for obstruction of justice, applying an 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. SS 5K2.4 and 5K2.14, calculating the 
amount of loss for the food stamp fraud, failing to give a downward 
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, failing to adjust his 
sentence 
for "family and his tremendous civic involvement," and failing to inquire 
into his ability to pay restitution "in excess of $700,000." See 
Appellant's 
Br. at 3. 
 
Initially counsel also challenged the district court's failure to advise 
of 
the affect of special parole. However , at oral argument, he conceded that 
argument was without merit. We agr ee. Although the Rule 11 colloquy 
here does not contain an explanation of what could happen if Mustafa 
violated supervised release or special par ole, it does show that Mustafa 
was informed that the maximum sentence was 830 years imprisonment 
and a maximum term of five years supervised release. App. 39-41. His 
sentence of 135 months imprisonment plus five years supervised release 
is far less than the maximum that was explained to him. See United 
States v. Electrodyne Systems, 147 F . 3d 250 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
4. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedur e 11(h) provides: 
        (h) Harmless Error. Any variance from the procedures required by 
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Mustafa's request to withdraw his guilty plea is based 
upon his contention that the court failed to infor m him that 
restitution could be ordered as part of the sentence, and 
the court's failure to inquire into the pr omises that Mustafa 
said had been made outside the change of plea hearing. He 
also argues that his plea should be withdrawn because he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel before pleading 
guilty. 
 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(1)(c) provides: 
 
       (c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of 
       guilty . . . the court must address the defendant 
       personally in open court and inform the defendant of, 
       and determine that the defendant understands, the 
       following: 
 
       (1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, 
       the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if 
       any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by 
       law, including the effect of any special par ole or 
       supervised release term, the fact that the court is 
       required to consider any applicable sentencing 
       guidelines but may depart from those guidelines under 
       some circumstances, and, when applicable, that the 
       court may also order the defendant to make r estitution 
       to any victim of the offense. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 
Mustafa correctly asserts that the word"restitution" was 
never used during the change of plea colloquy. The 
government did inform Mustafa that he could be fined 
$1,260,000 plus twice the amount involved in the money 
laundering scheme. However, as Mustafa points out, 
restitution is not the same as a fine. A criminal fine is a 
form of punishment, whereas restitution is merely intended 
to compensate the victim. United States v. Edwar ds, 162 
F.3d 87, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, although this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       this rule which does not effect substantial rights shall be 
       disregarded. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). 
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distinction is real, it is irrelevant her e. See United States v. 
Electrodyne Systems, 147 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
In Electrodyne Systems, the district court erred in 
advising the defendant of the correct statutoryfine on one 
of the counts he pled guilty to. Id. at 252. The defendant 
was, however, properly advised of the total maximum fine 
that could be imposed on a second count that he also pled 
guilty to. The total fine that was imposed was less than the 
stated maximum on that latter count. We held that the 
court's error as to the amount of the fine that could be 
imposed on the first count was harmless. W e concluded: 
 
       [w]hen all is said and done, the immutable fact is that 
       [the defendant] was advised its maximum fine exposure 
       was $1,010,000, when in fact the maximum fine 
       exposure was $1,500,000, Defendant was fined $1 
       million, an amount below the exposure about which it 
       was informed. Under this circumstance, the error must 
       be characterized as harmless. 
 
Id. at 253. 
 
Here, Mustafa was advised that he faced a fine of several 
million dollars but was actually ordered to pay far less than 
that amount in restitution. However , he clearly was 
informed of the potential financial exposur e that his plea 
subjected him to, and the amount he was order ed to pay 
was far less than the maximum that he could have been 
ordered to pay. Accordingly, despite the technical 
distinction between a fine and restitution, no substantial 
rights were affected by the district court's failure to 
specifically mention restitution or infor m Mustafa that he 
could be ordered to compensate the victims for any 
financial loss. Thus, the error was har mless. 
 
B. 
 
In his brief before us, Mustafa argues that his plea was 
not voluntary because when the court asked him whether 
other promises had been made, he answer ed, "yes," and the 
court never inquired further. Rule 11(d) provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
                                9 
  
       Insuring That the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not 
       accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, 
       by addressing the defendant personally in open court, 
       determining that the plea is voluntary and not the 
       result of force or threats or of promises apart from a 
       plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to 
       whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or 
       nolo contendere results from prior discussions between 
       the attorney for the government and the defendant or 
       the defendant's attorney. 
 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d) (emphasis added). 
 
As noted above, during the change of plea pr oceeding, 
the Assistant United States Attorney r ead the plea 
agreement to the court, Mustafa, and his attor ney. The 
court then asked defense counsel, "is that your 
understanding of the agreement," and counsel responded: 
"It is, sir." App. at 41. The court then asked the same 
question of Mustafa, and he answered, "Y es." Id. The court 
and Mustafa then had the following exchange: 
 
       THE COURT: Do you think any other promises have 
       been made to you? 
 
       DEFENDANT MUSTAFA: Except what they said right 
       here. 
 
       THE COURT: In open court her e? 
 
       DEFENDANT MUSTAFA: Yes. 
 
Id. There was no further inquiry by the court, counsel, or 
the government, and that "omission" is the basis of part of 
Mustafa's attack on the Rule 11 colloquy. However , the 
court's failure to inquire further must be viewed in context 
with the entire colloquy. Prior to the exchange that we have 
set forth above, the Assistant United States Attor ney 
advised the court and Mustafa that: 
 
       [t]he plea agreement states that the defendant may not 
       withdraw the plea because this Court may decide to 
       decline to follow any recommendation or stipulation by 
       the parties. 
 
       The plea also indicates that no one has pr omised or 
       guaranteed Mr. Mustafa what the sentence will be, and 
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       the plea states that Mr. Mustafa is satisfied with his 
       legal representation and that he is agr eeing to plead 
       guilty because he is in fact guilty. 
 
Id. at 40 (emphasis added). In addition, immediately after 
Mustafa suggested that other promises had been made, his 
attorney stated: 
 
       I should add for the record, your Honor , that I've also 
       consulted with my client concerning the Sentencing 
       Guidelines and their applicability here. 
       I don't know if I spoke too soon, if the Court was going 
       to get to that, but in answering the Court's question, we 
       have gone over the Guidelines, and I've told him what 
       my understanding of those Guidelines are befor e 
       entering the plea. 
 
Id. at 42 (emphasis added). The judge then asked Mustafa 
if he had any questions "of me about what you'r e doing[ ]" 
and Mustafa answered, "[n]o, sir ." Id. 
 
Thus, the only reasonable conclusion that this record 
supports is that Mustafa had been advised of counsel's best 
estimate of what the court would actually impose, and 
Mustafa was interpreting counsel's estimate as a "promise" 
as to the sentence he was going to receive. Mustafa said 
absolutely nothing after his attorney infor med the court of 
guidelines discussions, and he never said anything to 
suggest that his affirmative response about other promises 
was anything more than a reference to"assurances" he had 
received from his attorney as to what sentence would most 
likely be imposed. 
 
Mustafa was told that the total maximum sentence was 
830 years of imprisonment. The sentence of imprisonment 
he received, though substantial (135 months), was far less 
than the maximum that he was aware of. Mor eover, any 
alleged misrepresentations that Mustafa's former counsel 
may have made regarding sentencing calculations were 
dispelled when Mustafa was informed in open court that 
there were no guarantees as to sentence, and that the court 
could sentence him to the maximum. Thus, we conclude 
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that Mustafa's answering "yes" to the court's inquiry about 
promises is not grounds to invalidate his plea.5 
 
C. 
 
Mustafa argues that the district court err oneously used 
the guideline for money laundering, U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1, to 
calculate his sentence. Since he did not object to using that 
guideline at sentencing, we review this claim only for plain 
error. United States v. Cefaratti , 221 F.3d 502, 512 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citing United States v. Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366,370 
(3d Cir. 1997)). 
 
In United States v. Smith, 186 F.3d 290 (3rd Cir. 1999) 
we explained the proper inquiry for deter mining when 
U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1 applies. There, the defendants had been 
convicted of 15 counts of money laundering arising out of 
an embezzlement/kickback scheme. Id. at 293. The scheme 
involved Smith diverting numerous corporate checks to his 
own creditors for the announced purpose of securing the 
services of various lobbyists. The sentencing judge 
sentenced the defendants pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1, 
and they argued that was error. Id. at 297. 
 
In reversing, we began by explaining that: 
 
       In determining sentences, courts consult the Statutory 
       Index, Appendix A to the Guidelines Manual for a list 
       of guidelines that correspond to the statute of 
       conviction. See U.S.S.G. S 1B1.2(a) and App. Note 1. If, 
       however, `in an atypical case,' the guideline indicated 
       for the statute of conviction is `inappropriate because 
       of the particular conduct involved,' the court is 
       instructed to use the guideline `most applicable to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We recognize that the maximum sentence authorized by law is often 
so extraordinarily long that few defendants other than "career criminals" 
plead guilty with the expectation that the maximum sentence applies to 
them. However, all that the law requir es is that the defendant be 
informed of his/her exposure in pleading guilty. The law does not require 
that a defendant be given a reasonably accurate"best guess" as to what 
his/her actual sentence will be; nor could it, given the vagaries and 
variables of each defendant's circumstances and offending behavior. See 
United States v. Clearly, 46 F. 3d 307, 311 (3rd Cir. 1995). 
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       nature of the offense conduct char ged.' Appendix A at 
       417 (Introduction). 
 
       Appendix A sets up a two-step inquiry: 
 
       1. Does the designated guideline apply or is the 
       conduct `atypical' in comparison to that usually 
       punished by the statute of conviction; and 
 
       2. If the conduct is `atypical' which guideline is more 
       appropriate? 
 
Id. We also offered the following guidance: 
 
       In making its selection, the sentencing court must 
       determine if the conduct being punished falls within 
       the particular guideline's heartland, a set of typical 
       cases embodying the conduct described in each 
       guideline. 
 
Id. at 297-98 (internal quotations omitted). Inasmuch as 
the money laundering statutes had only recently been 
enacted when S 2S1.1 became effective, and the statutes 
did not have the extensive history of other federal crimes, 
we focused on the statements of the Commission itself to 
assist in determining if a given offense fell within the 
statute's "heartland." Id. at 298. W e stated, 
 
       [f]or that reason the Commission chose a high offense 
       level to punish the activity which had aroused 
       congressional concern: 1) situations in which the 
       laundered funds derived from serious underlying 
       criminal conduct such as significant drug trafficking 
       operation or organized crime; and 2) situations in 
       which the financial transaction was separate fr om the 
       underlying crime and was undertaken to either: a) 
       make it appear that the funds were legitimate, or b) 
       promote additional criminal conduct by r einvesting the 
       funds in additional criminal conduct. 
 
Id. (citing United States Sentencing Commission, Report to 
the Congress: Sentencing Policy for Money Laundering 
Offenses, including Comments on Department of Justice 
Report at 3 & n.2 (Sept. 18 1997) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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We also noted that U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1 had been criticized 
because it resulted in "sentences for money laundering 
offenses [that] were substantially greater than sentences 
established for the less serious crimes that pr oduced the 
laundered proceeds (e.g., minor fraud)." Id. (quoting United 
States Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congr ess: 
Sentencing Policy for Money Laundering Offenses, including 
Comments on Department of Justice Report at 3 & n.2 
(Sept. 18 1997)). We observed that the Commission 
appeared to respond to this criticism by proposing 
amendments directed at " `both the seriousness of the 
underlying criminal conduct,' and to `the natur e and 
seriousness of the laundering conduct itself.' " Id. at 299 
(citing United States v. Woods, 159 F .3d 1132, 1135 (8th 
Cir. 1998). However, Congress did not approve the changes 
because of its concern that doing so would send the wrong 
message. Id. Nevertheless, the House Report did 
acknowledge that: 
 
       the application of the current guidelines to r eceipt-and- 
       deposit cases, as well as to certain other cases that do 
       not involve aggravated money laundering activity, may 
       be problematic. Nevertheless, past sentencing 
       anomalies arising from relatively few cases do not 
       justify a sweeping downward adjustment in the money 
       laundering guidelines. 
 
Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 104-272, at 14-15, reprinted in 
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 348-49) (internal quotations 
omitted). We inferred that the House Judiciary Committee 
meant for resolution of these "anomalies" to be left up to 
the courts. Id. (citing Woods, 159 F.3d at 1135). 
Accordingly, we concluded that "the Sentencing 
Commission itself has indicated that the heartland of 
U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1 is the money laundering activity connected 
with extensive drug trafficking and serious crime." Id. at 
300. 
 
That "heartland" conduct was not, however , present in 
Smith's case. The money laundering there was based solely 
on the 15 checks sent to Smith's creditors, and Smith's 
conduct left a "paper trail" that was the antithesis of any 
claim of planned concealment. Id. (citing United States v. 
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Caba, 911 F.Supp. 630, 636 (E.D.N.Y .), aff 'd, 104 F.3d 354 
(2d Cir. 1996)). We stated: 
 
       The money laundering activity, when evaluated against 
       the entire course of conduct, was an `incidental by- 
       product' of the kickback scheme. The root of 
       defendant's activity in this case was the fraud . . . 
 
       * * * 
 
       To use the money laundering guideline in this routine 
       fraud case would let the `tail wag the dog.' 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 
We concluded by finding that the Commission's 
"overarching directive" is "to match the guideline to the 
offense conduct which formed the basis of the underlying 
conviction," and held that Smith's case "pr esents one of 
those anomalies that Congress intended the courts to deal 
with fairly." Id. 
 
In United States v. Cefaratti, we applied the reasoning of 
Smith. 221 F.3d 502, 513-15 (3d Cir . 2000). There, Cefaratti 
pled guilty to mail fraud, student loan fraud, and money 
laundering. Id. at 504. Cefaratti owned a beauty school that 
participated in federal student financial assistance 
programs. Id. at 505. The school was authorized to act as 
a dispensing agent for federally funded Pell grants, and it 
also received Stafford loan checks. Id. Before the latter 
could be deposited into the school's account, the checks 
had to be endorsed by both the student and a 
representative of the school. Id. 
 
Pursuant to DOE regulations, a school could lose its 
eligibility to participate in federal student assistance 
programs if its students had an excessive default rate on 
their student loans. Id. The default rate at the defendant's 
school was so high that it would have jeopar dized its ability 
to receive these federal funds. 
 
In order to preserve the flow of the pr oceeds from student 
loans despite a poor default rate, Cefaratti manipulated the 
default rate by advancing false deferment and forbearance 
forms to lenders and by making payments on behalf of 
students who were on the brink of default. Id. The loan 
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checks at issue were mailed to the school and made 
payable to the student and the school. Id. at 511. As a 
result, the school received over $840,000 in federal funds 
that it would not otherwise have received because of its 
poor default rate. Id. at 506. 
 
On appeal, Cefaratti relied on our holding in Smith and 
argued that the sentencing court should not have applied 
the money laundering guideline in calculating his sentence 
because his case was "little more than r outine fraud to 
which the money laundering was incidental" Id . at 514. He 
insisted that his conduct was the kind of routine "receipt- 
and-deposit" anomaly that was not intended to be 
sentenced as money laundering because it "did not involve 
large scale drug trafficking or organized crime," Id. at 512, 
and was not the proper focus of S 2S1.1 under Smith. We 
rejected Cefaratti's argument, and explained that Smith did 
not depart from prior cases involving conduct similar to 
Cefaratti's.6 Id. W e stated: 
 
       We read Smith, in conjunction with our prior cases, to 
       stand for the unremarkable principle that in certain 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 809 n. 13 (3d Cir. 
1999) (sentencing under S 2S1.1; proceeds of scheme to embezzle excise 
taxes on fuel sales laundered by wiring funds between companies 
controlled by defendants); United States v. Cocivera, 104 F.3d 566, 570 
n. 2 (3d Cir. 1996) (summarily rejecting argument that S 2F1.1 rather 
than S 2S1.2 should have been applied wher e defendant who had 
committed medicare fraud and other crimes was also convicted of 22 
counts under S 1957); United States v. Conley, 92 F.3d 157, 162-63 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (sentencing under S 2S1.1; defendant convicted of running 
illegal gambling scheme and conspiring to do the same and to launder 
the proceeds); United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 410-13 (3d Cir. 
1996) (defendant sentenced under S 2S1.2 for , inter alia, misrepresenting 
the nature of his benefits plan and defrauding plan members of 
insurance premiums; indictment alleged defendant laundered funds 
through a series of accounts, property, and mortgages); United States v. 
Thompson, 40 F.3d 48, 50 (3d Cir. 1994) (defendants who intercepted 
and diverted funds mailed to securities fir m sentenced under S 2S1.1); 
United States v. Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305, 312-14 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(sentencing under S 2S1.1 where underlying conduct was 
embezzlement/kickback scheme involving employee benefit plan; 
rejecting argument that "core" offense of conviction was kickback scheme 
rather than money laundering). 
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       cases `strict focus on the technicalities of the 
       sentencing process obscures the overar ching directive 
       to match the guideline to the offense conduct . . .' In 
       Smith, the overarching offense conduct was `routine 
       fraud,' and the money laundering, though technically a 
       violation of S 1956, was merely an `incidental by 
       product' of that fraud. 
 
Id. at 514 (citations omitted). In r ejecting Cefaratti's 
contention that the money laundering guideline did not 
apply to his "garden variety" fraud we stated: 
 
       To be sure, the deposit of the fraudulently-obtained 
       Stafford loan checks can be characterized in this 
       manner. However, in Smith we emphasized the concern 
       of Congress and the Sentencing Commission with 
       separate financial transactions undertaken to legitimize 
       illegally-obtained funds or to promote additional criminal 
       conduct. The evidence in this case demonstrates that 
       Cefaratti used the proceeds of his mail and wir e fraud 
       to promote further acts of fraud. 
 
Id. at 514-15 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, we refused to view his case as merely one of 
receipt-and-deposit of fraudulently obtained funds, and 
concluded that the district court had not committed plain 
error in sentencing Cefaratti under that guideline. 
 
Recently, we again applied Smith in United States v. 
Bockius, 228 F.3d 305 (3rd Cir . 2000). There, Bockius 
pleaded guilty to wire fraud and money laundering. Id. at 
308. At sentencing, Bockius objected to the pr osecution's 
attempt to have the court apply the money laundering 
guideline, and the district court agreed. The court 
concluded that Bockius' conduct did not fall within the 
heartland of S 2S1.1 under Smith, and refused to apply that 
guideline. The government appealed. In defending the 
district court's refusal to rely uponS 2S1.1, Bockius argued 
that the district court correctly deter mined that his conduct 
fell outside the heartland of the money laundering 
guideline. We disagreed. We r eversed and remanded for 
application of the money laundering guideline stating: 
 
       Smith makes clear that a court's S 2S1.1 heartland 
       analysis should address whether defendants engaged 
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       in money laundering in which the laundered funds 
       derived from serious underlying criminal conduct such 
       as a significant drug trafficking operation or organized 
       crime or in typical money laundering in which a 
       defendant knowingly conducted a financial transaction 
       to conceal tainted funds or funnel them into additional 
       criminal conduct. 
 
Id. at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 
added). Bockius' conviction stemmed from embezzling 
funds in an escrow account and his subsequent attempt to 
funnel those funds into dummy corporations in the 
Cayman Islands, and foreign bank accounts. W e instructed 
the district court as follows: 
 
       [a]s noted in Smith, on remand the District Court 
       should engage in a heartland analysis before applying 
       the money laundering guideline. Where money 
       laundering is not "minimal or incidental," and is 
       "separate from the underlying crime" and intended to 
       "make it appear that the funds were legitimate" or to 
       funnel the money into further criminal activities, 
       S 2S1.1 is an applicable guideline. The guideline may 
       also be applicable if there is evidence that the activities 
       which fulfilled the broad statutory r equirements for 
       money laundering were connected with extensive drug 
       trafficking or other serious crime. 
 
Id. at 313 (emphasis added). 
 
Bockius' conduct was clearly more akin to traditional 
notions of money laundering than the conduct Mustafa 
engaged in here. Nevertheless, Mustafa pled guilty to 40 
counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1956(a) (1)(B)(i). He thereby admitted engaging in conduct 
that involved deposits of over $1.5 million that wer e 
intended to disguise the source and natur e of the proceeds 
of his fraudulent activity. Each of those deposits was 
separate and distinct from the criminal activity they were 
derived from. Moreover, in making each of the numerous 
deposits, Mustafa necessarily represented to the bank and 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture that he had received 
food stamps in a legitimate manner (in exchange for food), 
and his conduct was therefore intended to create an 
 
                                18 
  
appearance that the illegally obtained proceeds were 
legitimate. Of course, Mustafa needed to do this because 
the food stamps were of no use to him unless they were 
converted to cash. However, that does not negate the fact 
that he was concealing the original source of the funds, and 
he clearly intended to effectuate that concealment. 
 
Accordingly, we can not find that it was plain error for 
the district court to conclude that the financial transactions 
were separate from the underlying crime of food stamp 
fraud, or that the deposits were intended to make it appear 
that the food stamps were legitimate.7 Therefore, we will not 
reverse the district court's application of U.S.S.G. S 2S1.1.8 
 
Before discussing Mustafa's next allegation of error, we 
need to mention one final point. The United States 
Sentencing Commission amended the guidelines, ef fective 
November 1, 2000. Sections 1B1.1 and 1B1.2 wer e 
amended as well as Appendix A's introduction. Appendix 
A's introductory comments, as amended, omit language 
that we relied on in Smith. See Smith, 186 F.3d at 297 
(referring to Appendix A's reference to "atypical" cases). The 
Sentencing Commission's statement of its "Reason for 
Amendment" reveals that these amendments wer e 
"intended to emphasize that the sentencing court must 
apply the offense guideline refer enced in the Statutory 
Index for the statute of conviction," and specifically cites 
our opinion in Smith. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
app.C at 32 (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). 
 
Given these amendments, the continued relevance of 
Smith is open to question. Here, Mustafa was sentenced on 
September 3, 1999. Therefore, whether the sentencing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The government does not argue that Mustafa deposited the food 
stamps in order to reinvest the funds in additional criminal conduct. 
 
8. We are not unmindful of the abuse that can occur when the 
government relies upon the money laundering guideline to reflexively 
ratchet up penalties by stapling the money laundering guideline to the 
ultimate realization of financial gain that is the goal of nearly all 
criminal 
schemes. Here, however, Mustafa admitted money laundering and the 
conduct supporting his guilty plea involved converting vast amounts of 
food coupons into cash. Accordingly, the district court did not commit 
plain error in finding his conduct within the heartland of this guideline. 
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court was bound by the subsequent amendment depends 
on whether the amendment is a clarifying amendment or a 
substantive change to the guidelines. United States v. 
Roberson, 194 F.3d 408, 417(3d Cir . 1999) (explaining that 
"substantive amendments -- in contrast to clarifying 
amendments-- are not given retroactive effect"). The 
amendment directs the sentencing court to focus on the 
offense of conviction and apply the "applicable" guideline as 
determined by the Statutory Index in Appendix A without 
conducting the heartland analysis we requir ed under Smith. 
If the amendment applies to Mustafa's sentence (i.e. if it 
was merely a "clarifying" amendment), the money 
laundering guideline clearly controlled, and was properly 
applied. That is the applicable guideline for Mustafa's 
conduct under the Statutory Index in Appendix A, and 
Smith's heartland analysis would have been impr oper. On 
the other hand, if the amendment constituted a substantive 
change in the law, it could not be applied r etroactively to 
Mustafa's sentence, and Smith and its pr ogeny would still 
require the analysis we have conducted above. Accordingly, 
we need not determine if the amendment was a substantive 
change in the law because, under either scenario, 
application of the money laundering guideline her e can not 
rise to the level of plain error. 
 
III. 
 
Mustafa claims that his plea should be withdrawn 
because his attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective 
assistance. However, claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel are generally not cognizable on dir ect appeal. 
United States v. Tobin, 155 F.3d 636, 643 (3d Cir. 1998). 
The proper device for challenging assistance of counsel is a 
motion under 28 U.S.C. S 2255. Accordingly, we will not 
address this issue now. Mustafa can attempt to raise this 
claim in a properly filed petition underS 2255. 
 
IV. 
 
Lastly, Mustafa argues that the district court erred by 
never inquiring into his ability to pay the amount of 
restitution that was ordered. Our r eview of the record 
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confirms that the court did fail to conduct an adequate 
inquiry into Mustafa's ability to pay as requir ed under 18 
U.S.C. S 3664 (f)(2), See United States v. Coates, 178 F.3d 
681 (3d cir. 1999), and the government has conceded this 
error. To its credit, the government states that "the 
restitution order should be vacated and sentencing 
remanded for the sole purpose of allowing the court to 
access Mustafa's financial resources before re-ordering 
restitution." Government's Br. at 21. We agree, and we will 
remand for resentencing limited to the issue of Mustafa's 
ability to pay. Of course, the district court will be free to 
order restitution in an appropriate amount after conducting 
an appropriate inquiry. 
 
V. 
 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
district court except for the order of r estitution. The order 
of restitution will be vacated, and we will r emand for 
further proceedings to determine the amount of restitution, 
if any, that Mustafa should be ordered to pay. 
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